

# *The Public Integrity Project*



August 6, 2007

Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State  
1700 Broadway, Suite 250  
Denver, Colorado 80290

Delivered by hand

RE: Voting System Certification

Dear Secretary Coffman:

Previously I asked Jonathan Tee of your staff to identify who was in charge of the voting machine certification after the removal of Dan Kopelman from that position. I was told that no decision had been made about his replacement. The diagram on the Secretary of State website indicates that there is a Voting Systems Program Director who is in charge of the testing of voting systems. I have never received a response to my question. Who is acting as the Voting Systems Program Director? Who is leading the recertification of the DREs in your office?

The link provided below contains the reports from the California Top to Bottom review of voting systems recently completed by teams of experts appointed by California Secretary of State Debra Bowen. This review, which was done by nationally known experts, identified serious security vulnerabilities in the Diebold, Sequoia and Hart Intercivic DRE electronic voting systems which are currently under review by your office. As has been widely reported in the press, Secretary Bowen's review proved that it was possible to hack into these DREs and reprogram them to change votes without any leaving any evidence that the voting machines had been corrupted. As you will note, the review was done by teams of nationally known computer scientists with industry standard security testing procedures.  
[http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections\\_vsr.htm](http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm).

What is your office doing to address the security vulnerabilities identified by the California Secretary of State? What security testing is being done by your office to address these demonstrated security defects? Will your recertification of the Diebold, Sequoia and Hart Intercivic DREs specifically address the public findings of Secretary Bowen?

In *Conroy v. Dennis*, it was shown that almost no comprehensive security testing is done by the independent testing authorities. The decertified Sequoia, Diebold and Hart Intercivic DREs were

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
"tested" and "certified" by Ciber, Inc. Ciber, Inc. has lost its accreditation to test voting systems due to inadequate testing and documentation procedures. These facts raise grave questions whether Colorado can or should rely on the work done by Ciber, Inc.

Is your office planning to rely on the discredited work done by Ciber, Inc? What additional security testing are you doing to address the gap in security testing caused by well documented problems with Ciber, Inc.

Colorado voters are understandably concerned that these recent developments raise very serious questions about the integrity of Colorado's elections and your process for recertification of the Diebold, Sequoia and Hart Intercivic DREs.

I look forward to your prompt response to my questions.

Regards,



Claudia Kuhns

Executive Director

The Public Integrity Project

Be the Change USA

Received by Hunter Vauflora on behalf of Secretary of State  
Mike Coffman on August 6, 2007.