

# Colorado Elections 2008

## Framework for Primary and General Elections

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**Colorado Voter Group**

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### Contingency plan

Required if voting equipment is not certified.  
 Recommended even if voting equipment is certified.

#### Paper Ballots—Yes

**Preferred method.** Current system of polling place elections with precinct, early, absentee, and provisional voting. In addition:

- (1) Count votes on paper ballots only
- (2) Strengthen audits, tests, and canvass

**Record votes** on anonymous paper ballots. Use conditionally certified electronic vote recording equipment for accessible voting.

- To reduce the risk of contamination from electronic equipment, all votes recorded on the *voter verifiable paper audit trails* will be transcribed onto paper ballots by the bipartisan ballot duplication board.
- If HAVA permits, limit accessible voting to early voting locations, and extend early voting to include Election Day.

**Count votes** on paper ballots only. Count using either hand-counting or conditionally-certified optical scan vote counting equipment.

- To reduce the risk of undetected election contamination from electronic equipment, the logic and accuracy test, post election audit, and canvass of votes will be strengthened and extended to verify the work done by the ballot duplication board.
- If all votes are hand-counted, ballot designs should be optimized for accurate and verifiable hand-counting.

#### Mail Ballots—No

Colorado voters rejected all-mail Primary and General elections in a November 2002 statewide referendum, Amendment 28:

NO: 757,299 (57.6%)  
 YES: 557,573 (42.4%)

Risks:

- Dependence on new registration system
- Ineligible voters voting
- Disenfranchised voters
- Voter intimidation
- Vote buying/selling
- Not transparent
- Not anonymous
- No effective mitigation

#### Electronic Ballots—No

The greatest risk of election contamination comes from the counting and re-counting of votes recorded on invisible electronic ballots.

Risks:

- Known defects in security, accuracy, accessibility and verifiability
- No effective problem mitigation
- Excessive dependence on outside vendors

“The Secretary [SOS Mike Coffman] personally opposes mail ballot elections for several reasons:

- Because voting in mail ballot elections takes place in family and residential settings, mail ballot elections provide less privacy in voting and less protection against voter intimidation.
- The current system provides voters with a choice of voting either in person at a polling place or by mail by means of absentee ballot.
- Colorado’s voters turned down the proposal for mail ballot elections in 2002 (Amendment 28).”

— Joint Budget Committee testimony  
 November 15, 2007.

Election Priorities	Elements of the Election System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accurate</li> <li>• Accessible</li> <li>• Verifiable</li> <li>• Reliable</li> <li>• Secure</li> <li>• Transparent</li> <li>• Accountable</li> <li>• Anonymous</li> <li>• Secret ballot</li> <li>• Intimidation free</li> <li>• No vote selling/buying</li> <li>• No Illegal electioneer-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voter Registration Lists</li> <li>• Printed Poll Books</li> <li>• Individual Paper Ballots</li> <li>• Election Summary Report</li> <li>• Abstract of Votes</li> <li>• Logic &amp; Accuracy Tests</li> <li>• Post Election Audit Reports</li> <li>• Ballot Inventory</li> <li>• Independent Election Judges</li> <li>• Election Judges Reports</li> <li>• Poll Watchers</li> <li>• Independent Canvass Board</li> </ul>